Wednesday, June 07, 2006

Speaking of God

I would like to shift gears a bit and discuss how we speak about God.

Christians claim that God is wholly other and transcendent and in the Incarnation God became human in Jesus Christ of Nazareth. Thus, we must say something about God and we do, yet we must always keep in mind that our language can never "correspond" to God as this would require that God be a finite being comparable with language. So, how can we speak meaningfully about God with becoming idolators? This is indeed a difficult question and the one I want to address.

I want to propose, along with many others in the Christian tradition, the way of analogy. Analogy allows us to us know, albeit improperly, God and speak about him while allowing him to still be transcendent. Analogy differs from both univocal speech and equivocal speech. Univocal speech is using the exact same meaning of the word in different cases (e.g. John is good person and Salley is a good person.) Equivocal speech is when two terms have completely different meanings (e.g. Salley is a good person and that was a good bank robbery). Analogical speech is neither one of these.

Analogy is often thought of as A is to B as C is to D (A:B::C:D). An example of this is 2:4::3:6. Both are 1/2 of the other, so we can reduce them to a proportion. However, by reducing knowledge to a proportion we smuggled in a univocal core as this presumes a base 10 system. Thus, we cannot use analogy in this way to speak about God though it is useful in other areas. Analogy cannot have a univocal core if we want to retain God's transcendence. When we say "God is good" and "John is good" we cannot mean the same thing by "good." Even if we want to say that "God is perfect goodness" we must be careful not to make God simply the biggest thing around thereby once again fall into univocity. Put in formal terms: trying to find ways to explain analogy is always self defeating as the explanation requires finding a univocal core. So, is our language about God completely equivocal? We must say no, otherwise we can have no knowledge of God.

Another way to understand analogy is to that we can truly use the word "good" of both God and John without implying the shard any features or properties (univocity). If we pay attention to how we use analogy in an ad hoc manner, we can still retain its usage and therefore speak about God, albeit improperly meaning that the language does not function in the way it usually does in our knowing about other things.

Citing E. Gilson, David Burrell notes how for Aquinas, analogy refers to our capacity to make the kind of judgments that we do and that analogy, therefore, must be explicated on this level of judgment not a conceptual level like univocity requires (Analogy and Philosophical Language, 153-54). In other words, analogy is a practice not a theory. It is tempting to think that "practice" is reducible to a core. However, this simply manifests a confusion that we treat the noun "practice" just like other nouns like rock, house, and cat. These can be ostensively defined and explained (e.g. rocks are hard). However, part of the grammar of the word "practice" is that it is irreducible to logic or semantics. Does this mean analogic speech is irrational?

No. Just because something cannot be reduced to words doesn't mean it is not rational or even non-linguistic. A non-theological example would be saying to someone "Explain to me what a G note is." The problem is a G note cannot be explained! But that is not to say it is irrational . Sure, one can say how to play a G note (put your finger here) but this does not say what it is. Nonetheless, trained persons can recognize musical notes; this is hardly irrational. This is akin to how I want to understand analogy. Trained persons can speak analogously of God without falling into idolatry, but it does take training. This is one way in which theology is helpful; it helps us discipline our speech about God so we are not idolators.

Comments, questions, thoughts, ramblings???


Tim

14 comments:

Exist~Dissolve said...

Tim---

Good, though-provoking post. I especially appreciate the way in which you identified that manner in which univocal language is often "smuggled" into God-speak.

For example, this last semester, I wrote a paper on "omnipotence." For most, omnipotence is merely making God the strongest being in existence. As you have pointed out, however this mis-usage of langugage quantifies God, reducing the divine nature to an equation. (and some of the "equations" for omnipotence are quite long!)

I would propose that our language about God must be rooted in revelation, i.e., in the Incarnate Word of God in Christ. Going back to the issue of God's power, any language which we use, no matter how guarded or nuanced, will eventually create a contradiction in our conceptual understanding of God's power. However, if we speak of God's power in terms of Incarnation--specifically in relation to the "weakness" of the cross--we have a tangible frame of reference that enables us to not only make sense of the nature of God as revealed in Christ, but also to deploy language that will meaningfully describe it and avoid the problem of idolatry. Admittedly, such an approach will never allow for the kind of linguistic precision which we desire, for in speaking in light of Incarnation, we will constantly be torn between the tension of transcendence/immanence. But perhaps this is best...

Finally, a G-note is the tone produced at 392Hz. :)

Tim said...

Hi, Joel,

Thanks for your comments.

I wonder if placing immanence and transcendence in tension a priori creates a univocity we want to avoid, or at least treating transcendence and immanence like "thing nouns" that need to be brought together. In other words, if this tension exists then Jesus' human and divine natures would have been in tension. However, isn't the point of the Incarnation to reveal true humanity and divinity as not in tension? That's not a rhetorical question, BTW. Though, of course, just because they are not in tension doesn't mean our speech can fully grasp it.

I completely agree that our speech about God be tied to Revelation. However, when most evangelicals hear "revelation" they think of "Bible" (and Bible as a book; I think this is another bad result of the Reformation) and not Jesus. This risks making an epistemic "criteria" the ontological ground of creation, aka idolatry.

Exist~Dissolve said...

tim--

Good call on the univocity of immanence/transcendence tension. I definitely overlooked that in thinking through this issue.

My meaning, more specifically, wasn't that a tension necessarily exists in Christ as God/human, but that rather the way in which we think categorically about the Incarnate God is tensioned. Too many times I've heard either, "Well, Jesus couldn't/could've done "X" because He's God" or "God is like "X" because Jesus is like "X." If we are being thoroughly orthodox in how we think through these issues, our language about God and/or Christ can not be reduced to determining what belongs to transcendant and immanent God. Rather, the revelation of God in Christ (as the God/human) forms the criterion for our God-talk.

As to your critique of the Reformation's consequences use of Scripture, I completely agree.

In what way do you see analogical language functioning in reference to the Church's language about the Triune nature of God?

Tim said...

Joel,

You don't mess around do you? Going straight for trinitarian language. :-) This is a good question, and I wish I had a great answer but I don't think I do. I will say a few things to get us started though.

I want to deny that our language is only self-referential; that is, it doesn't refer to God, only to us. However and at the same time, we must pay attention to our use of words: when we employ them, how we do so, for what purposes, in what context, etc.

So, one God in three persons. Here we go: Right now I follow Aquinas and what he calls "redoublement" which means we must always keep in mind which way we are speaking about God, his oneness or threeness. If his oneness then we cannot attribute predicates to the divine nature that are only for the persons. And, vice versa for the threeness. The consequence of this is that each is a mode of speaking (one and three) is different "language game" so to speak. We must be careful not to get them confused. They are each just as true as the other and both are needed to speak truthfully about God.

A good metaphor for this is Wittgenstein's duck rabbit. W drew a picture of a duck/rabbit. The duck's beak was the rabbits ears, it shared an eye, etc. However, you can only see one at a time (either the duck or the rabbit), though both are present, and describe one at a time. It makes no sense to talk about a rabbit's beak. This is analogous to the one and threeness of God, I think.

Does this make any sense?

I am not completely satisfied with this as it is lacks some metaphysical "umph" so to speak. However, I can't tell if my desire for that is good or bad. What do you think of all this?

Nathan Crawford said...

Boys. Boys. It is all univocal. Even to begin talking about God necessarily pits God in some sort of structures in which the frame of reference is always our frame of reference. The horizon on which we "place" God is always a horizon that we construct and "believe" God should be placed within. In fact, to even begin talking about "God" necessarily places "God" within certain structures (for us, these structures are Christian and to an extent, evangelical Christian).

So, I say, let's chuck it all. Ok, I don't. But, I do say that the language that theology must begin to embrace is metaphorical. In fact, I think that this is the language that Aquinas even uses. Analogy tends to promote the similarity between two objects. Tim's example of 2:4::3:6 is perfect. We see similarity. However, a metaphor rests on the nonsimilarity of the two. It is a "complete slap in the face" theologically. It is a simultaneous telling of a truth (little uncomfortable with this word) and a lie. An example being "God is a rock." Obviously, we don't worship rocks. But we still use this phrase. Why? Well, it gives us truth about God, but in a different way than analogy.

Ahh...let the fun begin.

Peace.

Tim said...

"It is all univocal." Nate, you know better than that. So, I will ignore it.

Nate, I think you misunderstand the kind of analogy I am proposing. We both want to reject a proportional understanding of analogy. I am trying to describe analogy not based on similarity between words. The similarity lies in human capacity to judge, judgment. When you say "see a similarity" this is what I am putting my finger on and trying to make sense of. Also, I don't think analogy and metaphor are opposed. I do think metaphor is a legitimate use of speaking about God. What do you see as some of the differences between metaphor and analogy? I think an important similarity (if you will let me say that) is that both require judgment. We pick certain words and recognize the meaning when spoken. This doesn't mean there is a univocal core; it only means that in this particular act of speaking one can see (or judge) a family resemblance between the words thereby making some sense out of it. This is all that is needed, I think.

Nathan Crawford said...

Tim, I actually don't know better. I think that (in good Derridean fashion) that in all equivocal or analogical (or for that matter, metaphorical) language about God, there is a trace of univocal language. Let me explain though. You'll still disagree with me, but let me explain.

Essentially, in equivocal/analogical language, the goal is to try and talk about God in a way that is not centered on necessary correlations between humanity and God. The problem is that in our language, we make the necessary correlations. We cannot talk of God outside of our speech and so, our speech that is steeped in our own humanity necessarily brings language to be univocal. Even when we try to hide it, it is there. This is because our frame of reference for thinking of the analogy is always ourselves. So, we are the frame of reference for thinking about God. Disagree vehemently with this - I know you will and it needs to be disagreed with.

I think that metaphorical language differs from analogical language in a very simple way - it hinges on the "is". Ricoeur talks of this in Rule of Metaphor. Essentially, metaphors are false statements while simultaneously being true statements. Our language about God is full of them. The goal of the metaphor is to be shocking and disjuncted in a way that gives rise to thought and does not draw a direct connection between humanity and God. Analogy does draw this connection because it relies on the similarity.

I have a class on Philosophy and Theology and we have been talking of religious language. I think that I may have actually convinced my classmates of this and my professor. Well, we'll see.

Peace brother.

Exist~Dissolve said...

Nate--

However, a metaphor rests on the nonsimilarity of the two. It is a "complete slap in the face" theologically.

Is a metaphor really these things, though? The fact that you wish to claim that metaphor "rests on the nonsimilarity of the two" indicates that you have actually capitulated the veracity of analogical language (i.e., that "things" are similar, for without similarity, how could one have "non-similarity?), but are merely attempting to do that which is contrary. So in seeking to delegitimitize analogical language, it appears, to me at least, that this is actually legitimitizing it by using the very categories and tactics of analogical language to defeat analogical language.

It is a simultaneous telling of a truth (little uncomfortable with this word) and a lie. An example being "God is a rock." Obviously, we don't worship rocks. But we still use this phrase. Why? Well, it gives us truth about God, but in a different way than analogy.

How is this different, fundamentally, than analogical language? In order to "tell the truth" about something, one must admit to some form of similiarity between the ideas to which one applies the category of "truth." And in the same way, to simultaneously tell a "lie" about the same requires not only that one assume the analogical relationship of ideas, but moreover that one press this analogical relationship to its logical conclusion. After all, as I see it, to tell a "lie" about something is merely to infinitize the analogical relationship of the ideas under consideration.

That being said, I didn't get alot of sleep, so much of my contribution in the above is probably rubbish on the right side of a cup of coffee.

Nathan Crawford said...

Joel,

Analogies draw points of comparison. They initiate something where the two parties involved share some trait or mode of being or whatever. So, when we talk about God, we attribute to God things similar to what we attribute to ourselves. I mean, really, if one thinks about it, God functions (in much of theology) as the perfect being, bringing to perfection all that is. The analogy is that God is that which is created, just infinitized. I'm not comfortable with this.

Metaphor, on the other hand, is to make a bald-faced lie. When I say, "God is the Good Shepherd" I am lying. God, as far as I know, is not a good shepherd. Yet, this statement contains meaning and some sort of truth. We find this statement good. So, the statement is true in the fact that it is a lie. The lie ruptures our sense of reality so that we are able to inundate it with meaning. We fill metaphors with meaning, allowing them to overcome us.

I think the real problem is that we believe metaphors and analogies are the same things. I'm just not sure that they are, or at least that they do not function the same.

Tim said...
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Tim said...

Nate,

I think you are talking about the same thing but calling it metaphor. Analogy is not a simile. It is simply taking two or more words, ideas, or whatever you want to call it and bringing them together. There does not need to be a univocal core for it to function; this is what I am arguing for. I am claiming that we can't SAY anything about God directly it can only be SHOWN. This showing is the judgment that the language we are using works or makes sense. Like you said, there does not have to be univocity to find meaning. Things can be similar and not be the same or share some sort of "core" or "foundational" meaning. What if the similarity is simply a recognition that can change from case to case and doesn't have to stay the same? This is what I am talking about. This is the way language oftenn functions.

Again, I think you misunderstand analogy, especially the way Aquinas uses it. He does not offer a theory or explanation of it (this is why "doctrine of analogy" is a bad way to describe it); it is only seen or shown in USE.

Exist~Dissolve said...

Nate--

You said:

Analogies draw points of comparison. They initiate something where the two parties involved share some trait or mode of being or whatever. So, when we talk about God, we attribute to God things similar to what we attribute to ourselves. I mean, really, if one thinks about it, God functions (in much of theology) as the perfect being, bringing to perfection all that is. The analogy is that God is that which is created, just infinitized. I'm not comfortable with this.

Nor am I. However, there is really no way in which to avoid it. As we have no access to that which is beyond human experience, and moreover because all of this experience is filtered through human language, any experience or description of the divine will necessarily be mediated through these categories. Therefore, even to tell a "lie" about God in metaphor is not qualitatively different than deliberately attempting to you analogous language.

Metaphor, on the other hand, is to make a bald-faced lie. When I say, "God is the Good Shepherd" I am lying. God, as far as I know, is not a good shepherd. Yet, this statement contains meaning and some sort of truth. We find this statement good. So, the statement is true in the fact that it is a lie. The lie ruptures our sense of reality so that we are able to inundate it with meaning. We fill metaphors with meaning, allowing them to overcome us.

I don't agree that "the lie" ruptures our sense of reality. As we are the ones doing the lying with our language, such is really just another semantic game. It gives no better concepetion of "truth" than any other form of speaking, for all are mediated to our understanding by our self-created language. In this way, then, as the very way in which we use language creates the actual parameters for what is a linguistic "lie," rather than rupturing our sense of reality, such a "lie" has actually reinforced our conception of reality and the way in which we perceive it to be constructed. By attempting to tell the "lie," we have actually capitulated the fact that that which we wish to "lie" about is, in our understanding, worth positing as true.

I think the real problem is that we believe metaphors and analogies are the same things. I'm just not sure that they are, or at least that they do not function the same.

I do not necessarily think they are the same things. However, I do think they both fail on precisely the same level.

Exist~Dissolve said...

Sorry! In my first comment above, "you analogous language" should read "use analogous language."

Seifer's Lair said...

Squall--

You're an idiot. Obviously, your puny brain is not capable of holding together the concept of "truth" and "lie" in the unifying context of "language." The noise that proceeds from your mouth is both obtuse and screeching.

I would suspect that my gunblade up your posterior would clearly reveal to you the self-evident difference between analogy and metaphor.

 
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